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Abstract 
P2P networks are distributed, acentric and self-organized systems. Due to the incomplete information of network 
environment, the uncertainty of trust relationship among peers and the selfishness of the peers in P2P networks, which give 
rise to many free-riders that seriously impact the stability and scalability of  P2P networks. In this paper, by analyzing the 
incomplete information of  network environment, the uncertainty of trust  relationship among nodes, the phenomenon of the 
free-riding is studied based on game theory. The IIDGTrust (Incomplete Information Dynamic Game Trust)mechanism is 
presented through the case “Supplying the Public Resources”. Updating the trust relationship among the nodes according to 
the Bayesian law, which make nodes choose better strategies in time. The experimental results demonstrate that the IIDGTrust 
mechanism can effectively reduce the proportion of the free-riders in the P2P networks and maintain the stability of networks 
better.  
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1.  Introduction 
In  recent years, with the successful application  of Gnutella, KaZaA,  Napster  etc., the application of the P2P 
systems has made progress rapidly. However with the development of the P2P systems, the problems of 
robustness, safety, scalability and etc. of the networks are also becoming more and more important. Since 
literature[1] found the free-riding phenomenon in P2P systems,  the phenomenon have been studied by some  
researchers. A measurement result [1-2] of  Gnutella  system shows that peers who provide no files account for 
proximately 70% in 2000, and that top 1% of the peers provide approximately 37% of the total responses queried. 
But in 2005, the number of free-riders increased to proximately 85% in Gnutella. In 2006, a measurement of e-
Donkey file sharing network in literature [3] found  that there  were about  80% free-riders. The existence of so 
many free-riders, severely affect the stability of the whole system. Besides [4-5] found that the problems of 
collusion, false  reports, zero-cost identities, traitors, whitewashing etc. in the system have brought lots of hidden 
troubles to the robustness and safety of the P2P networks. Paper[6] analyzed the game among  the strangers with 
∗ Corresponding author: Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, China
E-mail address: lgbabcdefg@163.com;
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1346   Guo-yong Cai et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  9 ( 2012 )  1345 – 1353 
alysis of ree-riding phen
n
the case ‘eBay auction website’ and illustrated  the necessity of Trust mechanism with experimental data. In  the  
absence of  incentive mechanism, a study of[7]  also shows that users’ enthusiasm of providing evaluation 
information is not very high. Therefore, in order to ensure the stability and the safety of the networks, it is 
necessary to establish a sustainable mechanism to promote the stable running of the P2P network.  
The research achievements of trust mechanisms and models are summarized by literature [8-10] in different 
periods. At present, the research of trust mechanisms can be mainly classified into three aspects: trust 
mechanisms based on fuzzy theory, trust mechanisms based on probability, and trust mechanisms based on game 
theory. During the interaction in the networks, peers’ behaviours are mainly involved, and peers make decisions 
and weight the payoff depending on how much they trust the opponents. Thus, comparing with trusts based on 
fuzzy theory and probability, trust mechanism based on game theory seems more applicable.  
There already have some researches on the trust mechanism based on game theory. Feldman M elaborates the 
free-riding problem and the serious consequences caused by the problem in paper [11] and points out some reasons 
of free-riding caused and provides some methods of solving the problem. In [12] Golle P analysis free-riding 
problem based on the game theory, presents the incentive mechanism based on the micro-payment, and proves 
the effectiveness of the mechanism restraining free-riding problem in network. In order to solve the free-riding 
problem, literature [13] established an incentive compatibility mechanism based on the mechanism design theory, 
which essentially is asymmetrical information game theory. However literatures mentioned above studied trust 
mechanisms on the basis of the static game or complete information dynamic game theory. Obviously, the 
uncertainty of the trust and the incompleteness of the information are not considered in these literatures. In the 
condition of incomplete information, paper [14] analyzes the process of implementing the cooperative equilibrium 
based on repeated game on the platform of taobao. But the dynamic of trust is not considered in the analyzing 
process.    
Combining the incompleteness of information and the uncertainty of trust among peers in networks, this paper 
provides a new method of studying free-riding phenomenon based on the incomplete information dynamic game 
theory. Namely, under the circumstance of incomplete information, according to the different types and its 
distributions of the opponents, peers establish the initial trust. During interactions, in order to choose a 
responding strategy, peers update trust value using Bayesian law on the basis of the actions observed from the 
opponent peers. In order to better study the phenomenon of free-riding in P2P networks, this paper models 
‘Supplying the Public Resource’ from viewpoint of game theory. According the payoff matrix of the game 
playing among the peers, concrete analysis process of the trust mechanism IIDGRust is presented. The algorithm 
of interactions among peers is also described. At last, some simulation results are shown. 
2.  A Model of the ‘Supplying the Public Resource’ 
In economics, game theory is a theory of studying strategy selection and payoff equilibrium during 
interactions among the peers. For purposes of an  f omenon in networks, we formulate the 
free-riding behavior as the game .  denotes the set of peers in the 
networks. The behaviors strategies set dependent on type is denoted by i . The type of i is , and 
i is private information. In the condition of peer type , the prior probability is i i i i , which 
peer i thinks other n-1 peers’s types is 1 1 1i i i− − +  .The posterior probability is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,i i i i iaG N pΘθ=< >
a
'i s iθ( , , , ,θ θ θ θ=
u N(i θ
,θ
) i iθ ∈Θ( )|θ θ
−
θ p p=)( )|i i ip aθ− −, ,a a=  that peer i thought the other n-1 p)n ( ), ,i i i iu a a θ− eers’ type is i  after observing their action 1 1 1 .  is the payoff function of peer i. According to the game , 
some assumptions are set as follows: 
θ
−( , ,i i ia a a− − + G
 In the interaction, peers just have two strategies: provide or not provide, so there are just provider and free-rider 
in the analysis. 
 All peers hope the network can be long-term stable performance. 
 The functions of the peers are full symmetry, and the resources provided are available.  
 During the interaction, it is random matching to play game among the peers, who decide whether to provide the 
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resources at same time. 
 In order to better analyze the process, we take every stage game as the imperfect information static game. The 
payoff matrix of peers is shown in table 1. 
Table 1 payoff matrix of peers 
 Peer j 
 Provide Not-provide 
Provide 1 ,1i jc c− −  1 ,ic− 1  
Peer   i Not-provide 1, 1 jc−  0 , 0  
  
If peer does not provide the resources, then he will gain 1 units payoff. If provide ic units resources, then he 
will get 1 units of payoff. If both peer i and peer
i
− ic j do not provide resource, then both of them will get 
nothing. The c units of resources provided are private information of peers. ic  and j are also the types of the 
peer and
c
i j respectively, and they are independent and identical distribution. All the peers know that the units of 
resources provided by opponents obey a strict increasing and continuous function on the F [0, ]c   ( c >1). 
In P2P networks, the pure strategies of player i  denoted by ai(ci) are the mapping { }[0, ] 0,1c → . Let ai(ci)
0 denotes the player i does provide nothing, ai(ci) 1 denotes the player i does provide resources. Consider the 
table 1, the utility function of the player can be written as follows: i
0, 0i ja a
≠
=
ition of the equilibrium , the)
)∗
( ), , 1, 0, 1,
1 1,
i i j i i j
i i j
u a a c a a j i
c a a
= = =
− =
0,
1
( ), , max( , )i i j i i j i iu a a c a a c a= −
= =
, then . 
3.  The IIDGTrust Mechanism 
3.1. One-stage game 
 Consider the game mentioned above and the related defin  [15]  Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium of the peers can be denoted by a strategy profile ( . So, we have the inequalities: 
j
 and . 
is the expected value. 
( ), ( )i i j ja c a c
∗ ∗
E ( ( ), ,c j i i j ju a c a c ≤E ( , ( ), ) E ( ( ), ( ), )jc i i j j i c i i i j j iu a a c c u a c a c c
∗ ∗ ∗≤
E
) E ( ( ), ( ),
i ic j i i j j j
u a c a c c∗ ∗
In P2P networks, in the condition of equilibrium, the probability of anyone player j  providing the resource is 
denoted by . So the following formula holds.  ( ( ) 1)p P a c∗ =
E ( ax( , ( ))
j jc i i j j i i
i
u a a a c c a
j r j j
, ( ), ) E mi j j i ca c c
[ ] ( )[ ]max( ( ),1) 1 max( ( ),0)
(1 ) max( ( ),0)
j i i i i j i i i
j j i i i i
p a c c a p a c c a
p p a c c a
= − + −
= + − −
i
∗ ∗
= −
−  
The formula above implies: a). If player i provides resources, then , the formula result is1 .  ( ) 1i ia c =
( ) 0a c =
ic−
                             b). If player provides nothing, then , the formula result isi i j . p
So, if the inequality 1 i j holds, it implies player i will get more payoffs when he provides resources. 
We have the following expression (0) in view of maximizing the expected payoff of player . Similarly, 
c p− >
i
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j . expression (1) holds to player
                                                                                                                                  (0) 
( ) 1, 1a c c p∗ = ≤ −
i
( ) 0, 1
i i i j
i i i ja c c p
∗
= > −
( ) 1, 1a c c p∗ = ≤ −
                                                                                                                                      (1) 
( ) 0, 1
j j j i
j j ja c c p
∗
= > − i
i r
The expressions (0) above implies that player i has a critical point ic  about whether or not to provide 
resources i . The ic obeys the strict continuous distribution which is an increasing function. So, player i will 
provide the resources  if and only if the inequality 0  holds.  
∗
c
ic ic c
∗≤ ≤
When ,[0, ]i ic c
∗∈ ( )( ( ) 1) (0 )i i r i i ip P a
1 (i
∗
)
c∗
c P c c F c∗ ∗= ≤ ≤
1 ( ))ic F F c
∗
= − − 1 (1= − −
∗
∗ 1 1 (i i F c
∗ ∗
= − = −
( ))c
, then ic p . So,  
satisfy the formula . The equation c F  will have a unique solution c . 
Then the formula (2) must hold. 
)
F
i
ic
∗
∗
                                                                                                                                     (2) 1 (i jc c c F c= = = −
∗ ∗ ∗
In conclusion, when the unique value exists, the only Bayesian-Nash equilibrium must be exists. So, when 
the type of the player , player  provides resources, otherwise nothing.    
c∗
i ic ≤ i
3.2. The utilities of the two-stage game 
The interactions among peers can be seen as the process of repeated games. We assume that the probabilities 
of two kinds of peers encountered by a player i are equal to the proportion of that type of peers in networks. In 
order to analyze the process of the dynamic game, two-stage game of the interaction among players is analyzed 
and each stage game can be considered as imperfect information static game. To get the total utilities of a 
player in two-stage game, some parameters are set as follows.  i
Let pi denotes the probability of player providing resources in the first stage of a game. Probability of player 
deciding to provide the resources in the second stage game is denoted by
i
xy
ip . x and denote the strategies 
of players ,
y
i j  respectively about whether or not to provide resources in the first stage game. denotes 
player provides nothing and 
0x =
i 1x = i
δ 1<
2
l
00 01 00 01[ 0(1 )] [(1 )( ) ( )]U p p c p p p pδ= + − + − + + +
 denotes player does provide resources. We denote the discount factor 
of the expected payoff of the two stages game by ( ), which can be considered as players’ patience to 
the succeeding stages game. The smaller the value, the payoff of the current stage will be valued more seriously; 
otherwise, more attention will be shifted to succeeding stages game. The concrete parameters value will depend 
on the environment of the networks.  
0 δ<
According the parameters mentioned above, the total expected utilities of the players in a two stages game 
can be obtained and denoted by 
i
1
1
( )li i
l
U uδ −
=
=
( )u l
 
i is the expected utilities of the players in the l
th stage game. If players provide nothing in the first 
stage game, that is i i ,then according to table 1, the concrete total expected utilities of players in the 
two stages game can be obtained with formula (3).  
i i
( )a c = i0
ip +
00 01 00 01[(1 )( ) ( )]
i j j i i i j j
j i i j jp c p p pδ= + − + +
                                                                               (3) 
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j
j
If player provides resources in the first stage game, that is . The concrete total expected utilities of 
the players in the two stages game can be obtained with formula (4). 
i
i
( ) 1i ia c =
10 11 10 11(1 ) [(1 )( ) ( )]i i i i i jU c c p p p pδ= − + − + + +                                                                                         (4) 
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition of player i deciding to provide resources satisfies the 
inequality (3) (4), i.e. ≤
10 11 00 01 10 11 00 01 00 01 10 11[1 ( )] [1 ( )] [ ( )]i i i i i i i i i j j j jc p p p p p p p p p p p p pδ δ δ+ + − − ≤ + + − − − + + − − . 
So there exists a value i . Player decides to provide resource in the first stage game, if and only if c i i ic c≤  
holds.The following section 3.3, the utility of a second stage game will be analyzed through the trust changing 
based on the Bayesian law among the peers in networks.  
3.3. The dynamic change of trust among the peers 
According to the definition of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium which is a fixed point, the optimal strategy of 
the current stage game can be chosen if given the prior probability of the trust of the players. The posterior 
probability of players’ trust can also be obtained by computing the Bayesian law on the basis of the equilibrium 
strategies and the opponent’s actions observed.  
Considering the equilibrium of the one-stage game and formula (2) mentioned above, we know that there 
exists c  which make the refine Bayesian-Nash equilibrium satisfies i j . By combining the analysis of 
the first stage game in section 3.1, the equilibrium of the second stage game is discussed by dividing it into three 
cases on the basis of analyzing the strategies choice and the dynamic change of peers’ trust.  
' ' ' 'c c c= =
( ) 0, ( ) 0,a c a c i= = ≠ j
Case 1: Both player and do provide nothing in the first stage game. That 
is i i j .In such case, by observing the history of player , player i knows the 
strategies of player in the last stage and will obtain a new trust value by updating the prior trust (prior 
probability) of player through the Bayesian law. The new trust value (posterior probability) can be denoted by 
a conditional probability  
i
j
j
j
j
j
'0, c c<
'
'
'
( | ( ) 0, ( ) 0) ( ) ( ) ,
1 ( )
i
r i i i j j i
i
P c a c a c F c F c c c
F c
= = =
− ≥
−
                                                            (5) 
As the second stage game also is a one-stage game. Based on the analysis of one-stage game mentioned above, 
there must exist '[ , ]c c c∗ ∈ . Hence, player i will provide resources in the second stage game if and only if 
 hold. Where c satisfies the formula holds. ' ic c c
∗≤ ≤ ∗
'∗
'
( ) ( )1 ( ) 1
1 ( )
F c F cc F c
F c
∗ ∗ −
= − = −
−
, that is '
1 (
1 (
F cc
F c
∗ −
=
−
)
)
∗
≠
                                                                         (6) 
Because , when the type of player i is , he provides nothing in the first stage game. Player 
will provide resources in the second stage because of the inequality ' . So the payoff of player in 
the second stage game is . 
' 1c c∗< < 'c
i 'ic c c= ≥ i'1 c−
Case 2: Both player , decide to provide resources in the first stage. That is . 
For case 2, the new conditional probability can be denoted   by 
i j ( ) 1, ( ) 1,i i j ja c a c i j= =
'0, ic c>
'
'
( | ( ) 1, ( ) 1) ( ) ,
( )
r i i i j j i
i
P c a c a c F c c c
F c
= = =
≤
. 
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Then, there must exists , and player i will provide resources in the second stage if and only if 
 holds. According to the formula (2), we know c  satisfies the equality                                               
c∗∗
'0 ic c c
∗∗< < ≤ ∗∗
'( ) ( )F c F c∗∗−
c
'c
( ) 1, ( )a c a c j= ≠ ' c< <
'c−
'
'( )
c
F c
∗∗
=                                                                                                                                         (7) 
So when , the utility of player in the second stage is . Then, the player whose 
type is  provide nothing. 
'0 c∗∗< ≤ i '( ) / ( )F c F c∗∗
Case 3: Player i provides resources, and Player ( i) provides nothing in the first stage game. That is 
i i j j . According to the analysis of one-stage game mentioned above, we have i jc c . 
In the second stage, the payoff of the player whose type is can be written as: 1 , if he provides resources in 
the first stage ; or 1 if he provides nothing in the first stage. 
j ≠
'c
0,i=
On the basis of analysis of equilibrium in the second stage game, here, the equilibrium conditions between two 
stages will be analyzed. According to the analysis of total expected utilities of players in two-stage game and the 
payoff results of players in second stage. We know that the c , the separation point about whether or not to 
provide resources satisfies the following formula 
' ' ' ' ' ' '
'
( )(1 ) [ ( ) (1 ( ))(1 )] ( ) [ ( ) (1 ( ))(1 )]
( )
F cc F c F c c F c F c F c c
F c
δ δ− + + − − = + + − − '
∗∗
=
*
' *( , )c c c∈
*c≥
*c c≤
( ) 0=
( )a c
                                           (8) 
The left of formula (8) is the total expected discount utility of two-stage game in the condition of player 
providing nothing in the first stage. The right is the total expected discount utility of two-stage game in the 
condition of the player providing resources in the first stage. By combining the formula (7) and (8), the equality 
(9) can be obtained. So the equality (9) is the equation must satisfy.  'c
' ' '1 ( ) ( )F c c F c cδ ∗∗− = +                                                                                                                                   (9) 
According to expressions (2) and (9), we have  and . Because of the 
strict increasing function  about  and , there exists  if .Then 
, that is 1 , so we have c c . 
* *( ) 1c F c+ =
0, 0c∗∗> >
1 <
' '( )(1 ) 1c F c cδ ∗∗+ +
' *( ) ( )F c F c>
' *
( )F c
*c>
c
*
δ
>
'c c>
' '( )(1 ) ( )c F c c F cδ ∗∗+ + +
According to the analysis mentioned above, the perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can be concluded. If the 
type of player , then player should provide resources in the first stage and it is not necessary to 
provide resources in the second stage; if c , then player need not to provide resources in the two stages; or if 
, then player should provide resources in the two stages. In the interactions among the peers, the expected 
utilities of the players will be optimal if they obey the process mentioned above. 
4.  The IIDGTrust Algorithm 
According to the analysis mentioned above, the interaction among the peers can be briefly divided into the 
following seven steps. 
(i). If , namely, player i enter the network for the first time. Let initial trust of the player i be random 
number between 0 and 1, and the initial strategy be a c . Or access step (ii). 
1l =
i
i i
(ii). Player interact with any player , and i gets the type of c  and observe the action of player and 
inquire the value of  whether equals 1. 
j j
j j
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'c *c
(iii). There are three cases that player updates the prior trust to the player on the basis of the Bayesian law. i j
) If two players don’t provide anything in the last stage, that is ≠ . Then the 
players get the new trust value based on formula (5). 
( 0, ( ) 0,i i j ja c a c i j= =
 If both players do provide resources in the last stage, that is ≠ . Then the 
player gets the new trust value based on formula (7). 
( ) 1, ( ) 1,i i j ja c a c i j= =
 If player i provides resources and j provides nothing in the last stage, that 
is = ≠ . Then they will decide whether to provide resource on the basis of the 
analysis in case 3 of 3.3 and the last two cases. 
( ) ( ) 0,i i j ja c c i j1, a=
(iv). According to the result of step (iii) and the analysis of formula (8), we can get the game’s refine 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, which is the region with the separation of and .  
(v). Player will choose the better strategy on the basis of the refine Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. i
 If the type *c c≤ of player i hold, he will provide resources in every stage.  
 If ' *( , )∈ holds, player i will provide resources in current stage, but provide nothing in the second 
stage. 
c c c
 If *c c≥ holds, player i  will provide nothing in every stage. 
(vi). End the current interaction, if the game over, access (vii), or enter the next stage game and access (ii). 
(vii). End the algorithm. 
The interaction among the peers is briefly described by the algorithm. Algorithm also reflects the problem of 
updating the trust of the players by applying the Bayesian law and describes the strategies choice based on the 
new trust. All of these illustrate the uncertainty and dynamic of trust relationship among peers in networks.  
5.  The Experimental Result and Analysis 
We here simulate the effectiveness of the IIDGTrust avoiding too many free-riders in network. The simulation 
is based on the software NetLogo 4.1. The peers are indicated by turtles, and the green patches stand for 
resources. Let the total peers in the P2P network is 1000, and there exists three types of players as follows: 
(1). Contributors (CP) who always provide resources no matter what happens. Their percentage is q.  
(2). Free-riders (FP) who never provide resources. Their percentage is (1-q)t, 0<t<1. A certain amount of free-
riders will meets the actual demand in the P2P systems. 
(3). Rational Players (RP) who whether or not to provide resources will depend on the situation of the network. 
If there are rich resources in network, they will provide nothing, at that time, or they provide some resource. At 
some time point, RP is taken as CP or FP according to their providing resources or not. Their percentage is (1-
q)(1-t).  
On the basis of the analysis mentioned above, the following parameters are given as q=0.2 t=0.7, c 2, and 
type c obeys a uniform distribution[0 , and the distribution function is, 2] ( ) / 2F c c=
2 / 3∗ = ' 0c =
. By formula (2), we can 
get c , and by formula (6), we get . 
The result of simulation without IIDGTrust mechanism, peers interactive randomly. The phenomenon can be 
illustrated in figure 1. Time is represented by the horizontal coordinates and the change of the all kinds total peers 
and total available resources over time is represented by the vertical coordinates. When the simulation begins, 
there are rich in resources in the initial system. The RP do not need to provide anything. So, the RP will be taken 
as FP under such circumstance. Because CP always provide resources no matter what happens, which make the 
FP survive. With the system running in Fig. 1, we know that the resources in the system are provided by the CP 
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whose percentage is 20%, which will led to a shortage of resource in network long time, and will prevent the 
development of the scale of the system.  
The result of the simulation after using the IIDGTrust mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2. When the 
simulation begins, there are rich in resources in the initial system. In the meantime, the total number of FP 
increases quickly, and the resources in the system decreases sharply. Comparing to the simulation result without 
using the IIDGTrust mechanism, there is no obvious difference before this time. But in the following periods, 
because of the IIDGTrust mechanism, when the initial resources decrease sharply, the RP have to provide 
resources to the system to increase their utilities, so that the number of the CP increases and remains a steady 
level. The number of the FP also decreases to a steady level. So, the system also maintains a relatively stable state. 
From the Fig. 2, we know that the percentage of the CP keeps about 59.9%(599/1000 in Fig. 2), which has 
improved dramatically comparing to about 24%(242/1000) in Fig.1. 
Comparing the Fig.2 and Fig.1, we know that the mechanism can decrease the total free-riders (758 in Fig.1 
and 401 in Fig.2) effectively in network and establish a good foundation to the stable development of the system.  
Fig. 1. The result of simulation without the IIDGTrust                              Fig. 2  The result of simulation with the IIDGTrust 
6.  The Conclusion 
There are many free-riders in the P2P networks. At present, to the limitations of study on problem, by 
analyzing the incompleteness and the dynamics of the trust among the peers in the networks, the paper study the 
trust mechanism based on the Incomplete Information Dynamic Game. Firstly, we provide the “what if” analysis 
of the game playing among the players. Secondly, on the basis of the case “Supplying the Public Resources”, the 
analysis and the deduction of the trust relationship of the game playing among the players are given. The results 
of the simulation demonstrate that the IIDGTrust mechanism can make the percentage of the peers keep 
reasonable proportional relationships, which provide a better stability of the network. 
Because the trust mechanism is based on the hypothesis, the other attacks such as the collusion, false reports, 
etc in the P2P networks are not considered in the analysis process. Besides, if the same resources are owed by 
some player, which player should we choose? The problem also has not been considered. We will research these 
problems in the future work. 
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